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Introduction
In Belgium, the share of wages in GDP has declined quite 
sharply  over  the  past  five  years,  the  main  counterpart 
being a growing share for the operating surplus. These 
developments have attracted close attention of late, with 
frequent references to a shift in incomes from individuals 
to firms. Against the current backdrop of rising inflation, 
such discussions often mention a possible fall in the pur-
chasing power of individuals. However, a downward trend 
in the wage share does not necessarily imply a fall in the 
incomes and purchasing power of individuals. It merely 
reflects a weaker relative rise in wages compared to the 
total  income  generated  by  the  economy.  In  any  case, 
wages are not the only income category for individuals : 
their income from wealth, such as interest and dividends, 
must also be taken into account, as must social benefits 
and taxes.
This article aims to promote the objectivity of this social 
debate, partly by clarifying exactly what lies behind such 
concepts as wage share, operating surplus and corporate 
profit. In addition, the recent decline in the wage share 
raises a number of questions which this article aims to 
answer in the light of a historical and international com-
parison. How is value added divided among the various 
primary income categories, namely wages, indirect taxes 
and  residual  operating  surplus ?  Has  the  recent  con-
traction of the share of wages in value added reduced 
the  wage  share  to  an  exceptionally  low  level ?  Was  it 
followed  by  a  redistribution  of  incomes,  e.g.  between 
companies and individuals ? Have individuals and compa-
nies adjusted their spending in line with their change in 
income, or are all the changes absorbed by more saving or   
dissaving ?
The distribution and allocation of incomes are analysed 
on the basis of the national accounts data, which offer 
a systematic description of the various phases in the eco-
nomic  process :  production,  income  formation,  income 
distribution and income allocation. The official NAI data 
on the sectoral accounts are available only for the period 
1995-2006 ; for 2007, the analysis is based on the spring 
projections  which  the  Bank  produced  recently  as  part 
of  the  common,  biannual  exercise  conducted  by  the 
Eurosystem central banks  (1).
This article is structured as follows. Section 1 concerns the 
formation of incomes as a direct result of the production 
process, with a detailed examination of movements in the 
wage share, i.e. the share of value added which is paid 
out in the form of wages. Then follows an analysis of the 
redistribution  of  income  between  sectors  and  the  pur-
poses for which the economic agents use their income. 
Section 2 focuses this analysis on individuals, examining in 
turn their disposable income, their savings ratio and their 
financing balance. Section 3 contains a similar analysis for 
companies, focusing mainly on their gross operating sur-
plus and their financing balance. Finally, the main findings 
of this study are summarised in the conclusion.
(1)  For more information on the Bank’s spring projections and the underlying 
assumptions, see NBB (2008), “Economic projections for Belgium – Spring 2008”, 
Economic Review, June, 7-28. The NAI will not publish the official data for 2007 
until the end of September 2008.
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1.    Formation of incomes as a direct 
result of the production process
This first section describes how gross domestic product, 
i.e. total value added, is generated and how that value 
added  is  distributed  between  the  production  factors 
(labour  and  capital)  and  general  government  (via  net 
indirect taxes, i.e. after deduction of subsidies). It analyses 
the income flows from the point of view of the sector 
generating the output.
Since it is not possible to consider all economic agents 
individually, they are grouped into “institutional sectors” 
in the national accounts, on the basis of their principal 
activity.  For  the  analysis  in  this  article,  some  of  these 
sectors  are  aggregated,  leaving  three  main  domestic 
sectors, namely companies, individuals and general gov-
ernment. The companies sector comprises both financial 
and  non-financial  corporations.  The  individuals  sector 
covers  not  only  households,  including  self-employed 
workers,  but  also  non-profit  institutions  serving  house-
holds  (1).  Companies  and  individuals  together  form  the 
private sector, i.e. the total economy excluding general 
  government.
1.1  The creation of value added
In order to make a product, a producer uses not only the 
production factors labour and capital, but also commodi-
ties, intermediate products and services supplied by other 
producers.  To  avoid  double  counting,  the  value  added 
of an individual producer is defined as the value which 
he adds to the commodities, intermediate products and 
services of other producers which he uses, with the aid 
of his own workers and equipment. The value added can 
therefore be calculated as the difference between the sale 
value of the output and the amounts paid to other pro-
ducers for the supply of commodities, intermediate prod-
ucts and services, known as intermediate consumption  (2).
Since the principal activity of companies consists in pro-
ducing  market  goods  and  services,  it  is  not  surprising 
that they create more value added than individuals and 
general  government.  The  relative  share  of  companies 
in total value added has risen steadily over the past ten 
years.  In  2006,  companies  generated  total  gross  value 
added  of  190.6    billion  euro,  representing  60.2  p.c.  of 
GDP at current prices, compared to 57.9 p.c. in 1996. 
While the value added of companies showed an annual 
average  increase  of  4.5  p.c.  between  1996  and  2006, 
GDP increased by an average of 4.1 p.c. per annum at 
current prices.
This weaker GDP growth was due mainly to the fact that 
the value added created by individuals grew less rapidly 
during that period. Although this reduced the share of 
individuals from 17.8 p.c. of GDP in 1996 to 15.4 p.c. in 
2006, the value added created by individuals still repre-
sented 48.7 billion euro in 2006. That value added origi-
nates mainly from the activity of self-employed workers 
(totalling 23.3 billion euro) and the production of housing 
services, whether or not for own use (totalling 22.2   billion 
euro). It is mainly the value added of self-employed work-
ers that has grown more slowly in the past ten years, at 
an annual average of 1.9 p.c. compared to 3.1 p.c. for 
the  production  of  housing  services.  This  is  due  largely 
to  a  decline  in  the  number  of  self-employed  workers, 
which dropped from a total of around 711,000 in 1996 
to 679,000 in 2003, before climbing back to 695,000 in 
2006.
Of these three main domestic sectors, it is general govern-
ment that generates the lowest value added. In 2006, the 
value added of the public sector came to 42.6 billion euro 
or 13.5 p.c. of GDP. In the past ten years, it has fluctu-
ated between 13 and 14 p.c. of GDP without displaying 
any clear trend.
1.2  Incomes arising from value added
Producers use the value added created to pay their labour 
costs and net indirect taxes, i.e. after deduction of sub-
sidies.  The  national  accounts  define  the  remainder  as 
the surplus (or deficit) resulting from production activity, 
known as the sector’s gross operating surplus : this can 
be viewed as remuneration for the capital used. For self-
employed workers, who belong to the individuals sector, 
the remainder also implicitly contains the labour income 
for work carried out by the owners or by members of their 
family. Since that income cannot be distinguished from 
the operating profit made by them as entrepreneurs, the 
remainder is referred to as mixed income.
In  2006,  about  half  of  the  gross  value  added  of  the 
Belgian economy as a whole was used to pay for the pro-
duction factor labour. The other half was divided between 
net  indirect  taxes  (11.8  p.c.)  and  the  gross  operating 
(1)  Non-profit institutions serving households include unions, professional 
associations, political parties, sporting associations and charitable institutions 
financed by voluntary contributions from other institutional sectors.
(2)  However, there are two exceptions to this general rule, namely housing services 
offered by individuals and non-market services offered by general government. 
The gross value added which individuals create by producing housing services is 
calculated as the difference between the rents received (in the case of owner-
occupied housing, these are imputed rents) and housing-related expenses which 
are generally borne by the owners (such as the cost of a plumber or electrician). 
The gross value added generated by general government via non-market services 
is calculated as the sum of labour costs and depreciation. Such services – law and 
order, education and infrastructure – are usually provided free of charge or at far 
less than cost price, so that the application of the general rule would lead to a 
serious underestimate of the value added of the general government sector.the incoMes and financing Balance of individuals  
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Companies  ................ 190.6 115.5 60.6 0.1 0.0 75.0 39.4
Individuals  ................. 48.7 5.2 10.6 2.7 5.5 40.9 83.9
General government  ........ 42.6 37.5 88.0 5.1 12.0
Not broken down  (3)  ......... 34.7 34.7
Total economy  ............ 316.6 158.2 50.0 37.5 11.8 121.0 38.2
Source : NAI.
(1)  In the national accounts, labour costs include both gross wages and employers’ social security contributions.
(2)  For individuals and the total economy, this concerns both the gross operating surplus and gross mixed income.
(3)  Unlike other taxes on production – such as taxes on pollution or taxes on the use of ﬁxed assets for production purposes – taxes on products cannot be broken down 
among the various institutional sectors. This last category includes VAT, taxes on imports and excise duties.
 
surplus plus mixed income (38.2 p.c.). However, there are 
considerable variations between the three main domestic 
sectors.
The remuneration of labour as a production factor forms 
a very large part of the gross value added of the general 
government sector, at 88 p.c. Moreover, that proportion 
has risen steadily since the 1995 figure of 86.1 p.c. The 
other  12  p.c.  represents  the  gross  operating  surplus, 
which consists mainly of depreciation. In 2006, companies 
paid 60.6 p.c. of the value added which they generated 
in the form of wages, against an average of 64.3 p.c. 
in the 1995-2002 period. The main counterpart of the 
recent contraction in the wage share in the value added 
of  companies  lies  in  the  share  of  the  gross  operating 
surplus, which came to 39.4 p.c. of value added in 2006, 
against an average of 35.1 p.c. between 1995 and 2002. 
Finally, individuals used only 10.6 p.c. of the value added 
which they created to pay for the production factor labour 
(for domestic staff and for employees of self-employed 
workers). The major part – namely 83.9 p.c. – of the value 
added of individuals corresponds to their gross operating 
surplus and mixed income.
1.3  The wage share
The wage share reflects the way in which incomes result-
ing  directly  from  the  production  process  are  divided 
between the production factors. The economic debate, 
particularly  that  between  the  social  partners,  therefore 
pays close attention to this concept, especially if the wage 
share is changing significantly, as in the last few years.
1.3.1  Various possible definitions
The wage share in the total economy is often defined 
as the ratio between the wages paid by the three main 
domestic sectors combined and GDP. According to that 
definition, during the period 1995-2000 the wage share 
hovered around 51 p.c. of GDP, then increased to a peak 
of 52.4 p.c. of GDP in 2002, before subsiding to an aver-
age of 50.2 p.c. between 2005 and 2007.
The advantage of this concept is that it is very easy to 
calculate with a minimum of data, but it is also subject to 
various limitations. For instance, it is better to disregard 
net indirect taxes if the aim is to focus on the distribution 
of  wealth  between  the  production  factors  labour  and 
capital. That is the only way of ensuring that the sum of 
the wage share and the share of the operating surplus is 
always equal to 1. If net indirect taxes are disregarded and 
the wage share is therefore expressed as a percentage of 
value added at factor cost, then on average it exceeds the 
wage share as a percentage of GDP by 6.8 percentage 
points. However, given that the net indirect taxes keep 
closely in step with value added, this refinement has only 
a minor impact on the movement in the wage share, so 
that it virtually parallels the wage share in GDP. In the past 
three years, the wage share in the total economy aver-
aged 56.8 p.c. of value added at factor cost.
In  addition,  the  simple  definitions  of  the  wage  share 
make asymmetric use of the data on self-employed work-
ers. The value added which they generate is included in 
GDP and in value added, but their labour income does 
not form part of the labour costs. This means that the 78
above definitions underestimate the true share of labour 
income in total value added. Since the labour income of 
self-employed workers cannot be measured directly, an 
allocation formula has to be used to break down the gross 
mixed income of self-employed workers into a notional 
imputed labour income and the residual gross operating 
surplus. For this purpose, self-employed workers are often 
assigned an imputed labour income equal to the average 
labour  costs  per  employee.  In  the  period  2005-2007, 
the thus adjusted wage share in the total economy aver-
aged 67.8 p.c. of value added. Since the relative share of 
self-employed  workers  in  total  employment  in  Belgium 
displayed a downward trend in the period 1997-2003, the 
adjusted wage share recorded a somewhat larger decline 
than the non-adjusted wage share. In 2002, the adjusted 
wage share in the total economy still came to 71.1 p.c. of 
value added. In international comparisons it is advisable 
to use such an adjusted wage share ; this is because the 
degree to which the non-adjusted wage share underes-
timates the true share of labour income varies from one 
country to another, owing to differences in the percen-
tage of self-employed labour in total employment.
Finally, the analysis of the wage share is often confined 
to the private sector. For instance, the Central Economic 
Council calculates an adjusted wage share in the private 
sector in its technical report on the maximum available 
margins for increases in labour costs. Such an indicator 
can  be  used  as  a  synthetic  yardstick  for  assessing  the 
recent  movement  in  labour  costs.  It  can  also  be  used, 
for example, to examine the impact of globalisation on 
the wage share. Since the share of labour costs in value 
added is much greater in the general government sector 
than in the private sector, exclusion of the former results 
in a wage share which is 3.4 percentage points lower, on 
average. In the past three years, the adjusted wage share 
in the private sector has averaged 64 p.c. of value added 
at factor cost.
The various definitions of the wage share therefore lead 
to substantial differences in terms of level. Of all the defi-
nitions used here, the simple concept of the wage share in 
the total economy (as a percentage of GDP) results in the 
lowest level, while the adjusted wage share in the total 
economy (as a percentage of value added) gives the high-
est level. In general, however, all the definitions indicate a 
similar picture : a fairly stable pattern in the second half of 
the 1990s followed by a moderate rise and then a slightly 
steeper  fall  during  the  period  2003-2005 ;  since  then 
there has been little change in the wage share.
1.3.2    Possible reasons for the recent movements in the 
wage share
Up to now, the wage share has been considered only as the 
ratio between labour income and value added. However, 
the wage share can also be broken down into a number 
of components which provide more information on what 
is happening. Thus, a first step is to redefine the wage 
share as the ratio between real wages and value added in 
real terms. Changes in the wage share can therefore be 
seen as changes in real unit labour costs. This reveals that 
it is not only wages and economic activity that determine 
the movement in the wage share, but also inflation meas-
ured by the value added deflator. Finally, the impact of the 
number of persons in work can be isolated by regarding 
the wage share as the ratio between real labour costs per 
employee and (apparent) labour productivity.










where  C  represents  labour  costs ;  E,  is  the  number  of 
employees ;  T,  is  the  total  number  of  persons  in  work 
including  self-employed  workers ;  YN,  is  value  added 
at  current  prices ;  YR,  is  value  added  in  real  terms ;  P 












































CHART 1 V ARIOUS DEFINITIONS OF THE WAGE SHARE 
  (percentages of value added at factor cost, unless otherwise 
stated)
Sources : NAI, NBB.
(1) Percentage of GDP.
Adjusted wage share, private sector
Adjusted wage share, total economy
Wage share, total economy
Wage share in GDP, total economy (1)
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Consequently,  real  unit  labour  costs  –  and  hence  the 
adjusted wage share – will decline if real labour costs per 
employee rise less quickly than labour productivity. The 
movement  in  the  wage  share  is  therefore  determined 
by numerous factors, many of which are sensitive to the 
business cycle. The recent movements in the wage share 
should therefore be analysed in the context of the global 
deterioration in the economic situation in 2001 – caused 
by the bursting of the stock market bubble and the sub-
sequent cuts in business investment – and the economic 
recovery  which  started  in  2004.  In  order  to  clarify  the 
impact of the business cycle, this section will consider only 
developments in the private sector, as they are more sensi-
tive to the cycle. However, the conclusions are the same if 
the total economy is considered.
Since (apparent) labour productivity is calculated here as 
the ratio between value added and the number of per-
sons in work, that figure shows a strong positive correla-
tion with the business cycle. Generally speaking, several 
quarters elapse before employment responds to cyclical 
fluctuations, as it takes time and money to adjust produc-
tion capacity in line with changing prospects. The slacken-
ing pace of growth in 2001 therefore caused (apparent) 
labour productivity to decline by 0.1 p.c., compared to an 
average annual rise of 1.4 p.c. over the period 1996-2007 
as a whole, or 1.5 p.c. during the period 1996-2000. This 
was a significant factor behind the steep increase in the 
adjusted wage share in 2001. During the ensuing years, 
labour  productivity  again  grew  relatively  strongly  as  a 
result of drastic corporate restructurings which curbed the 
expansion of employment, contributing to a reduction in 
the  adjusted  wage  share.  Combined  with  the  incipient 
economic recovery in 2004, this boosted labour productiv-
ity by 2.2 p.c. in that year.
The  major  difference  between  the  period  1996-2002 
– which ended with a slight increase in the adjusted wage 
share – and the more recent period 2003-2005 concerns 
the movements in real labour costs per employee. Here, 
too, the business cycle played a very important role. In 
response to the deteriorating economic situation in 2001, 
companies tried to keep their labour costs down. In 2001 
and  2002,  that  was  achieved  mainly  by  adjusting  the 
number of hours worked per employee in line with the 
slowdown in production, via the system of temporary lay-
offs and by cutting the amount of overtime. This effect 
was in addition to the structural trend towards shorter 
working hours as a result of the expansion of part-time 
work. However, the impact on labour costs per employee 
was  limited  during  those  years  because  hourly  labour 
costs continued rising by more than 4 p.c. per annum. In 
Belgium, the movement in private sector labour costs is 
influenced mainly by collectively agreed wages, via real 
agreed adjustments or indexations. Under the law on the 
safeguarding of competitiveness, the increase in nominal 
hourly labour costs is largely determined by the indicative 
wage norm, defined by the social partners in the biennial 
negotiation of a central agreement on the basis of the 
expected movement in labour costs in the three main trad-
ing partners – Germany, France and the Netherlands – and 
any adjustments for slippages in the preceding two years. 
TABLE  2   BREAKDOWN OF THE ADJUSTED WAGE SHARE IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR



















1.  Number of hours worked per 
employee  ........................ 0.1 –0.6 –0.8 –0.2 –0.4 –0.2 0.2 0.2
2.  Hourly labour costs  ............... 2.1 4.3 4.2 1.6 2.5 1.8 3.0 3.7
3.  Labour costs per employee (1 × 2)  .. 2.2 3.7 3.5 1.4 2.1 1.6 3.2 4.0
4.  Value added deﬂator  .............. 1.0 1.8 1.4 1.4 2.6 2.3 1.9 2.0
5.  Real labour costs per employee   
(3  : 4)  ............................ 1.2 1.9 2.0 0.0 –0.5 –0.7 1.3 1.9
6.  Labour productivity   ................ 1.5 –0.1 1.9 1.4 2.2 1.1 1.6 1.1
7.  Real unit labour costs (5 : 6)  ........ –0.3 2.0 0.1 –1.4 –2.6 –1.8 –0.2 0.8
p.m. Adjusted wage share  
(percentages of value added)  ..... 67.2 67.7 67.8 66.8 65.1 63.9 63.7 64.2

























































CHART 2  HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE WAGE SHARE IN THE 
TOTAL ECONOMY
  (percentages of value added at factor cost)




(1)  Figures cannot be calculated for the private sector because there have been no 
harmonised data per sector since 1960.
In 2001 and 2002, companies were therefore bound by 
the central agreement concluded at the end of 2000 and 
based on a more favourable economic situation expected 
at that time. Altogether, real labour costs per employee 
increased by roughly 2 p.c. per annum in 2001 and 2002, 
exceeding the change in labour productivity and therefore 
expanding the adjusted wage share.
Although the number of hours worked per employee con-
tinued to fall in subsequent years, during the period 2003-
2005 it was mainly the slower rise in hourly labour costs 
which curbed the growth of labour costs per employee. 
This was due in particular to the lower indicative norms 
for  the  increase  in  nominal  hourly  labour  costs  during 
the  years  2003-2004  and  2005-2006,  which  reflected 
the expected wage moderation in the three main trading 
partners. In addition, during 2003-2005 the wage drift 
was  virtually  non-existent,  presumably  because  of  the 
gradually  deteriorating  labour  market  situation.  Finally, 
the increase in hourly labour costs was also contained by 
the reduction in employers’ social security contributions. 
Overall, the rise in labour costs per employee in the private 
sector averaged only 1.7 p.c. per annum in 2003-2005. 
Moreover, in 2004 and 2005 labour costs per employee 
increased by less than inflation, measured by the value 
added  deflator,  so  that  real  labour  costs  per  employee 
declined by 0.5 and 0.7 p.c. respectively, after remaining 
virtually unchanged in 2003. Combined with an increase 
in (apparent) labour productivity averaging 1.6 p.c. per 
annum, the fall in real labour costs per employee, averag-
ing 0.4 p.c. per annum, led to a significant decline in the 
adjusted wage share in the period 2003-2005.
It was therefore not until 2006 that the decline in the 
wage share was halted. In the past two years, real labour 
costs  per  employee  have  climbed  back  up  by  an  aver-
age of 1.6 p.c. per annum, in the context of favourable 
economic  conditions  and  rising  tensions  on  the  labour 
market.  Not  only  did  the  number  of  hours  worked 
per  employee  start  rising,  there  was  also  a  substantial 
increase in the wage drift. As a result, the rate of growth 
in real labour costs per employee was realigned with the 
increase in labour productivity, so that the reduction in the 
adjusted wage share gave way to stabilisation. In 2007, 
the  adjusted  wage  share  actually  increased  again  as  a 
result of the sharp rise in hourly labour costs.
1.3.3    Has the wage share dropped to an exceptionally 
low level in recent years ?
Now that the wage share has reached its lowest level for 
the past ten years, the question is whether that share is 
exceptionally low in historical terms. Considered over a 
longer period, the movement in the adjusted wage share 
in Belgium can be divided into three phases  (1). During the 
1960s,  the  adjusted  wage  share  in  the  total  economy 
fluctuated around 63.5 p.c. of value added. During the 
1970s, however, it increased steadily, peaking at almost 
74  p.c.  in  1981.  It  then  gradually  subsided  to  around 
68 p.c. of value added.
The very marked rise in the adjusted wage share during 
the  1970s  was  attributable  to  a  gradual  slackening  of 
labour productivity growth which was not accompanied 
by a slower rise in real labour costs per employee. On the 
one hand, the industrial countries recorded a structural 
slowdown  in  their  productivity  growth,  a  trend  which 
was further reinforced by the oil crisis which drove up the 
costs of companies and exerted further downward pres-
sure on their value added and labour productivity. Also, 
automatic wage indexation in Belgium meant that the oil 
price rises were passed on in higher wage increases which 
in turn fuelled inflation, triggering a “wage-price spiral”. 
This derailment of labour costs not only dented corporate 
profitability  in  Belgium :  combined  with  the  weakening 
productivity growth, it also led to a steep rise in real unit 
labour costs and hence in the wage share. Since labour 
costs in Belgium rose faster than those in the main trading the incoMes and financing Balance of individuals  
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partners, these developments also brought a substantial 
loss of competitiveness for Belgian companies.
In  the  early  1980s,  several  measures  were  taken  to 
restore  that  competitiveness.  For  instance,  in  February 
1982  the  Belgian  franc  was  devalued  by  8.5  p.c.  To 
temper  the  influence  of  that  devaluation  on  domestic 
prices and costs, simultaneous measures were taken to 
control labour costs. To that end, the link between the 
increase in hourly labour costs and inflation measured by 
the consumer price index was temporarily abolished. In 
1993, it was decided to make that link structurally less 
rigid, by using the “health index” as the benchmark for 
indexation. These measures produced the desired effect. 
Thanks to cost control, the expanding sales opportunities 
led to an increase in corporate profitability, so that value 
added rose faster and the wage share began gradually   
falling.
The recent decline in the adjusted wage share can there-
fore be seen as part of a downward trend since the peak 
of the early 1980s. The steepest fall occurred in 1982-
1989, followed by a partial recovery which has now been 
totally dissipated. The level of the past few years is there-
fore comparable with that of the late 1980s. We need to 
go back to the early 1970s to find an adjusted wage share 
which is lower than the figures recorded in recent years. 
Although  the  very  substantial  increase  in  the  adjusted 
wage share amounting to 10.6 p.c. of value added during 
the 1970s has not yet been entirely neutralised, rather 
more than half of it has since been offset by a gradual 
decline amounting to 5.5 p.c. of value added in the past 
three decades.
Another way of assessing the recent fall in the wage share 
in Belgium is to compare it with the situation prevailing in 
other euro area countries. When making an international 
comparison, it is desirable to focus mainly on the move-
ment in the wage share rather than the level, because 
the level varies widely from one country to another, even 
if  the  definition  is  confined  to  the  private  sector  and 
incorporates an adjustment for the labour income of self-
employed  workers.  However,  those  differences  of  level 
are  difficult  to  interpret  because  they  are  due  to  such 
factors as the structure of the economy (e.g. the relative 
share of the various branches of activity, or the weight 
of  taxation  and  social  contributions  on  labour  income) 
and methodological differences in the compilation of the 
national accounts (such as the estimate for undeclared 
employment).
Compared to what is seen in most other euro area coun-
tries, the adjusted wage share has contracted relatively 
sharply  in  Belgium  of  late,  declining  from  71.1  p.c.  of 
value added in 2002 to 67.6 p.c. in 2006. That represents 
a percentage fall of 4.8 p.c. compared to a fall of only 
2.2 p.c. in the euro area as a whole. However, in Germany 
the adjusted wage share also declined by 4.3 p.c., as a 
result  of  strict  wage  moderation.  Conversely,  in  France 
the adjusted wage share recorded a much smaller fall. 
Possible  reasons  for  that  are  the  significant  rise  in  the 
minimum wage and the steady extension of the 35-hour 
week. In so far as the resulting slower growth of labour 
productivity was not totally offset by a slower rise in real 
labour costs per employee, this resulted in a larger wage 
share.
However, if the recent decline in the adjusted wage share 
is viewed as part of the downward trend which began 
in the early 1980s, then the relationships are reversed. 
In comparison with most other euro area countries, the 
downward trend in the adjusted wage share in the total 
Belgian economy since 1980 has been less pronounced so 
far, at 8 p.c. For example, the adjusted wage share in the 
euro area as a whole dropped by 13.8 p.c. In Belgium’s 
three main neighbouring countries – Germany, France and 
the Netherlands – the decline was 11.5 p.c., 13.2 p.c. and 
13.7 p.c. respectively. Moreover, since the time series for 



















































CHART 3  INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF THE ADJUSTED 
WAGE SHARE IN THE TOTAL ECONOMY







contraction in the wage share in Germany and in the euro 
area as a whole is probably somewhat underestimated.
In addition, the slower downward trend in the adjusted 
wage  share  in  Belgium  followed  a  much  stronger  rise 
during the 1970s. Consequently, the adjusted wage share 
in the total Belgian economy is currently still 7.5 p.c. larger 
than in 1970, whereas in the three main neighbouring 
countries together and in the euro area the 2006 figures 
are respectively 8.3 and 10.6 p.c. lower than in 1970.
Overall, the wage share in Belgium thus exhibited a similar 
picture to that seen in the euro area : stabilisation in the 
1960s, then an increase in the 1970s followed by a grad-
ual decline. The synchronised nature of these trends in the 
wage share in most euro area countries and elsewhere 
suggests that the pattern was dictated mainly by common 
factors. In the literature, the downward trend in the wage 
share is often linked to structural developments such as 
globalisation,  technological  progress  and  the  growing 
importance of the tertiary sector of the economy  (1).
One of the effects of the globalisation of the economy is 
a marked increase in the world labour supply. Depending 
on the source, the integration of China, India and the 
former Eastern bloc countries into the global economy 
has doubled or even quadrupled the world labour supply 
compared to 1980. The impact of this additional labour is 
reflected mainly in a strong rise in the industrial countries’ 
imports of labour-intensive goods and services from those 
emerging  economies.  Since  the  industrial  countries  are 
specialising in more capital-intensive goods and services, 
there will be a decline in the share of the remuneration 
of the relatively scarce production factor labour in total 
value added. At the same time, however, globalisation is 
stimulating productivity and output via further specialisa-
tion, so that the total wage bill is also rising. The net effect 
of globalisation on the total wage bill in the industrial 
countries therefore need not be negative.
The impact of the growing world labour supply is also felt 
via increasing immigration and the offshoring of certain 
activities,  which  is  weakening  the  bargaining  position 
of employees in the industrial countries. This offshoring 
was stimulated in particular by the gradual liberalisation 
of  trade  and  capital  movements  and  by  technologi-
cal  progress,  which  has  made  it  possible  to  divide  up 
successive phases in the production process and conduct 
them  at  different  locations.  This  has  made  the  choice 
of production locations much more sensitive to relative 
movements in labour costs in the various countries.
In addition, technological progress has also increased the 
capital intensity of the production process. In that context, 
the link between the new technologies and the workers’ 
skills is very important. While information and commu-
nication technology (ICT) and highly-skilled workers are 
essentially complementary, ICT tends to be in competi-
tion with low-skilled labour. ICT has therefore tended to 
reduce demand for low-skilled labour and increase the 
productivity  of  highly-skilled  labour.  In  both  cases,  this 
leads to a larger share for the remuneration of the pro-
duction factor capital and a smaller wage share.
Finally, the expansion of the tertiary sector of the econ-
omy has also tended to reduce the wage share in Europe. 
Since the wage share is lower in the services sector than 
in industry, its growing importance in the value added of 
the total economy has caused a reduction in the average 
wage share. According to an EC study  (2), that effect was 
particularly significant in Belgium in 1986-1995, whereas 
since 1995 it has hardly been a factor.
2.    Disposable income, savings ratio and 
financing balance of individuals
Broadly speaking, the primary incomes described above 
accrue in the first instance to individuals (in the form of 
wages), to general government (in the form of net indirect 
taxes) and to companies (what is left after paying labour 
costs and net indirect taxes). These primary incomes are 
then  partly  redistributed  between  the  institutional  sec-
tors. Thus, individuals and companies pay interest on their 
outstanding loans, and receive interest on their savings 
or their bond portfolio. As shareholders, individuals also 
receive dividends from companies. In addition, both indi-
viduals and companies pay taxes and social contributions 
to general government, which uses part of these resources 
to finance social benefits to individuals. Finally, the three 
domestic sectors may also receive incomes from abroad or 
pay incomes to the rest of the world. The primary incomes 
described above, arising from domestic output, are there-
fore not the only factors which determine the disposable 
income of individuals and companies.
This section first examines the movement in the total dis-
posable income of individuals, a concept which covers not 
only the wage bill  (3) but also the gross operating surplus 
of individuals (including gross mixed income), net inter-
est received, dividends and social benefits received, and 
(1)  Cf. for example EC (2007), The labour income share in the European Union, 
Employment in Europe 2007, 237-272, and IMF (2007), The globalisation of 
labor, World Economic Outlook, April, 161-192.
(2)  EC (2007), Labour market and wage developments in 2006, with special focus on 
relative unit labour cost developments in the euro area, European Economy, N° 4.
(3)  The concept of the wage bill as a percentage of GDP is slightly different from 
the wage share concept used above, because the standpoint here is that of the 
recipient sector. This means that account is also taken of the wages of Belgian 
employees paid by the rest of the world, whereas wages paid in Belgium to 
foreign workers are disregarded. the incoMes and financing Balance of individuals  
and coMpanies
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also takes account of the taxes and social contributions 
paid and the balance of other current transfers. The aim 
is to examine whether the weaker growth in the wage 
bill during the period 2003-2005 was offset or reinforced 
by  the  movement  in  the  other  components  of  dispos-
able income. The next step is to analyse to what degree 
changes in individuals’ disposable income have had reper-
cussions on their final consumption expenditure, or con-
versely, whether they have been prompted to modify their 
savings ratio. Finally, if the investment of individuals is also 
taken into account, the scale of the changes in their net 
financial wealth becomes clear. It is thus possible to assess 
the extent to which the reduction in the wage share has 
led to a fall in the financing balance of individuals.
2.1    Disposable income of individuals
Since the mid 1990s, the disposable income of individu-
als has always exceeded the wage bill. However, this gap 
between gross disposable income and the wage bill has 
declined steadily, dropping from 14.8 p.c. of GDP in 1995 
to 7.9 p.c. in 2005, after which it expanded slightly again. 
While the wage bill as a percentage of GDP has changed 
little since the mid 1990s, there has been a downward 
trend in the total gross disposable income of individuals 
as a percentage of GDP. This means that, taken together, 
the other components of the disposable income of indi-
viduals have grown more slowly than the wage bill over 
that period.
Taking  the  period  1995-2007  as  a  whole,  the  gross 
disposable  income  of  individuals  declined  almost  con-
stantly in relation to GDP, falling by a total of 7.3 p.c. of 
GDP. Almost the whole of that fall is attributable to the 
movement in net property income, more specifically inter-
est income. As a result of the downward trend in interest 
rates this component of disposable income dropped by 
6.3  p.c.  of  GDP  between  1995  and  2007.  Conversely, 
the decline in the wage bill, down by only 0.7 p.c. of 
GDP over that long period, was certainly not the main 
determinant of the movement in the disposable income 
of individuals.
However, when expressed as a percentage of GDP, the 
disposable income of individuals slowed during the period 
2003-2005 at twice the rate recorded in preceding years. 
That sharper decline was due mainly to the movement 
in the wage bill, which declined by an annual average 
of 0.7 p.c. of GDP during that period, whereas between 
1996 and 2002 it had increased by an average of 0.2 p.c. 
of GDP per annum. However, the impact on disposable 
income was partly offset by fact that the weaker growth 
of the wage bill also slowed the amount of taxes and 
social contributions paid. During the period 2003-2005 
the latter actually declined by 0.5 p.c. of GDP per annum ; 
the tax reform introduced in 2001 was also a factor here. 
In  the  context  of  a  further,  similar  decline  in  interest 
income as a percentage of GDP, the slower growth of 
the wage bill therefore caused a substantial decline in the 
disposable  income  of  individuals,  averaging  1.2  p.c.  of 
GDP per annum, compared to an average fall of 0.6 p.c. 
of GDP over the period 1995-2007 as a whole.
The downward trend in the disposable income of indi-
viduals as a percentage of GDP does not imply a continu-
ous reduction of the income itself. On the contrary, there 
was  an  increase  averaging  3  p.c.  per  annum  between 
1995  and  2007.  In  real  terms,  after  application  of  the 
private final consumption expenditure deflator, the gross 



















Wage bill  ........................... 52.3 53.3 53.6 53.2 51.9 51.4 51.2 51.6
Gross operating surplus  (1)  ............. 15.0 14.5 13.8 13.7 13.2 13.1 12.9 12.8
Net property income  ................. 13.5 11.5 10.4 9.2 8.7 8.4 8.1 8.6
Social beneﬁts  ...................... 19.0 18.4 18.8 19.1 18.7 18.5 18.3 18.0
Taxes and social contributions (–)  ...... 33.6 34.0 34.2 33.9 33.1 32.7 31.7 31.9
Other current transfers  ............... 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7
Gross disposable income  ............ 67.1 64.2 63.0 62.0 60.1 59.3 59.4 59.8
Sources : NAI, NBB.






































CHART 4  MAIN COMPONENTS OF THE DISPOSABLE INCOME 
OF INDIVIDUALS, IN REAL TERMS (1)
  (contribution to the growth of the disposable income, 
percentage points)
Sources : NAI, NBB.
(1)  Data deflated by the private final consumption expenditure deflator.
(2)  The gross operating surplus, gross mixed income and the balance of current 
transfers excluding taxes and social contributions.
Taxes and social contributions
Net property income




disposable income of individuals increased by an average 
of 1.1 p.c. per annum. However, that average rise con-
ceals some fluctuations. The steady rise in the volume of 
the gross disposable income of individuals in the period 
1997-2001 was followed by a slight fall in the ensuing 
four  years ;  in  2006  and  2007,  there  was  a  return  to 
strong growth.
During the period 1998-2001, the disposable income of 
individuals increased by an average of 2 p.c. per annum 
in real terms, mainly as a result of the substantial growth 
of the wage bill during that period, although net property 
income and the gross operating surplus (including gross 
mixed  income)  both  also  contributed  around  0.3  per-
centage  point  per  annum  to  the  growth  of  disposable 
income.
In  contrast,  in  2002-2005  disposable  income  recorded 
(almost) negative growth in real terms. This was due partly 
to the deteriorating economic situation during the period 
2002-2003,  which  prompted  companies  to  curb  their 
labour costs, as already discussed in section 1. During that 
period, the contribution of the wage bill was therefore 
unusually small. In addition, net property income made a 
considerable negative contribution to disposable income 
growth in real terms, particularly in 2002 and 2003. This 
was  due  mainly  to  the  decline  in  interest  income,  but 
property  income  was  also  depressed  by  the  negative 
contribution from dividends received during that period. 
However, it is worth noting that in the period 1998-2001 
dividend income had risen very strongly, so that it had 
reached an unusually high level in 2001, namely 4 p.c. 
of GDP, compared to an average of 3 p.c. of GDP in the 
period 1995-2000. Despite the small positive contribution 
from taxes in 2003 – due to the abolition of the comple-
mentary crisis contribution and the implementation of the 
personal income tax reform – the gross disposable income 
of individuals declined by 0.5 p.c. in real terms that year. 
In  2004  and  2005,  there  was  again  negative  growth 
of disposable income in real terms, as the very meagre 
increase in the wage bill was too small to offset the nega-
tive contribution from net property income.
It was 2006 before disposable income really recovered. 
Not only did that year bring an increase in the wage bill 
of 2.1 p.c in real terms, the implementation of the final 
part of the tax reform initiated in 2001 also contributed 
to a 2.7 p.c. increase in gross disposable income in 2006. 
In 2007, taxes and social contributions again depressed 
disposable income, as in most other years, yet there was 
still 3.3 p.c. growth of disposable income, bolstered by 
the strong increase in the wage bill and by net property 
income which had a positive impact on the disposable 
income of individuals for the first time since 2001.
2.2    How do individuals use their disposable 
income ?
Individuals  use  the  bulk  of  their  disposable  income  to 
finance their final consumption expenditure. The remain-
der is classified in the national accounts under gross sav-
ings which, when expressed in relation to the disposable 
income of individuals, constitute the savings ratio.
Like gross disposable income as a percentage of GDP, the 
final consumption expenditure of individuals also displayed 
a downward trend as a percentage of GDP. However, the 
decline was far less pronounced than the fall in disposable 
income. The reduction in the gross disposable income of 
individuals as a percentage of GDP was therefore largely 
reflected in a downward trend in the savings ratio, which 
declined from 20 p.c. of disposable income in 1995 to a 
low point of 12.2 p.c. in 2005.the incoMes and financing Balance of individuals  
and coMpanies
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The  decline  in  interest  income  as  a  percentage  of  the 
disposable income of individuals was a contributory factor 
in this downward trend in the savings ratio. Since interest 
income is perhaps less likely than labour income to be 
spent on consumption, such a shift in the composition of 
the disposable income of individuals drives up the con-
sumption ratio and therefore reduces the savings ratio. 
However,  in  general  such  a  reduction  will  only  persist 
if  individuals  consider  that  their  income  prospects  will 
remain robust, both during their working life and in retire-
ment. In that respect, the consolidation of public finances 
which has taken place provides significant support.
In the period 2003-2005, the savings ratio declined faster 
than in the preceding years. The reason is that individuals 
tend to smooth their final consumption expenditure to 
some extent in the event of major fluctuations in their 
disposable income. The relatively steep fall in that income 
therefore  did  not  produce  a  corresponding  fall  in  final 
consumption expenditure – both considered in relation to 
GDP – but led to a sharper reduction in the savings ratio.
In the past two years, however, the savings ratio has risen 
again. Not only has the gross disposable income of individ-
uals grown more strongly, but final consumption expendi-
ture has also continued falling slowly as a percentage of 
GDP. The assertion that individuals try to maintain the level 
of their final consumption expenditure in the event of a 
dip in their disposable income is therefore equally valid for 
periods in which that income increases strongly. Thus, the 
rise in disposable income in 2007, as a percentage of GDP, 
did not trigger higher final consumption expenditure, but 
was fully reflected in higher savings.
As well as consuming, individuals also invest, principally 
in the form of housing construction and renovation. The 
savings ratio is therefore much higher than the eventual 
financing balance of individuals. In contrast to their sav-
ings, which displayed a downward trend as a percentage 
of GDP, the investment of individuals as a percentage of 
GDP  did  not  exhibit  any  clear  trend  in  the  1995-2003 
period. During that period, the fall in the savings ratio 
was  therefore  almost  entirely  reflected  in  a  decline  in 
the financing balance of individuals as a percentage of 
GDP.  Since  2004,  however,  individuals  have  consider-
ably increased their expenditure on housing construction 
and renovation, including in relation to GDP. This strong 
propensity to invest was underpinned mainly by the very 
low  mortgage  interest  rates,  while  the  boom  in  house 
prices on the secondary market also propelled the growth 
of investment in housing. This was reflected in a strong 
decline in the financing balance of individuals, down to 
less than 1 p.c. of GDP since 2005, compared to 8.1 p.c. 
in 1995.
2.3    The financing balance of individuals in an 
international perspective
Whereas in 1995 the financing balance of Belgian individ-
uals had exceeded the unweighted average for the three 
main neighbouring countries by 4.3 p.c. of GDP, in 2006 
only the Netherlands still had a lower financing balance. 
The downward trend in the financing balance of Belgian 
individuals (totalling 7.6 p.c. of GDP since 1995) is in stark 
contrast to the upward trend in the financing balance of 
German individuals (amounting to 2.9 p.c. of GDP), while 
TABLE  4  DISPOSABLE INCOME AND FINANCING BALANCE OF INDIVIDUALS


















1.  Gross disposable income  (1)  ......... 67.7 64.8 63.5 62.6 60.8 59.9 60.0 60.4
2.  Final consumption expenditure   ...... 54.1 54.2 53.5 53.4 52.7 52.6 52.5 52.4
3.  Gross savings (1 – 2)  .............. 13.6 10.6 10.0 9.2 8.1 7.3 7.5 8.0
p.m. Savings ratio  
(percentages of disposable income)   20.0 16.4 15.8 14.7 13.3 12.2 12.5 13.2
4.  Gross investment    ................. 5.8 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.7 6.1 6.5 6.8
5.  Other uses  (2)  ..................... –0.4 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5
6.  Financing balance (3 – 4 – 5)   ....... 8.1 5.2 4.6 3.6 2.0 0.8 0.5 0.7
Sources : NAI, NBB.
(1)  Including the change in the net claims of households on pension funds.








































CHART 5  INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF THE 
FINANCING BALANCE OF INDIVIDUALS






in the case of French individuals it is only in the last few 
years that the financing balance has begun to decline as 
a percentage of GDP. The Netherlands was the only coun-
try where the financing balance of individuals recorded 
a  downward  trend  throughout  the  period,  though  the 
fall was less marked than in Belgium. These divergences 
largely  reflect  the  pattern  of  disposable  income :  while 
the  growth  of  disposable  income  in  Belgium  and  the 
Netherlands did not keep pace overall with GDP growth, 
the ratio of disposable income to GDP remained practi-
cally unchanged in Germany and France.
Differences  in  spending  patterns  also  played  a  role.  In 
Belgium,  the  slower  growth  of  disposable  income  was 
largely absorbed by a decline in savings as a percentage 
of GDP, so that final consumption expenditure was not 
particularly  hard  hit,  whereas  this  was  less  true  in  the 
Netherlands.  In  addition,  individuals  in  both  countries 
stepped up their other expenditure – principally invest-
ment spending – to roughly the same degree. The smaller 
decline in savings as a ratio of GDP in the Netherlands was 
therefore reflected in a smaller reduction in the financing 
balance. In 2006, that balance had still been lower than in 
Belgium, and in 2005 and 2006 it was actually negative, 
implying that Dutch individuals saw a contraction in their 
net financial wealth as a percentage of GDP.
Differences in spending patterns were also the reason for 
the divergent trend in the financing balance in Germany 
and France. While disposable income in both countries 
remained  virtually  unchanged  as  a  percentage  of  GDP, 
German  individuals  saw  an  increase  in  their  financing 
balance, while in France the balance declined. The differ-
ence is due to the investment profile. Although German 
individuals  did  slightly  increase  their  final  consumption 
expenditure, the downward impact on the financing bal-
ance was more than offset by the fact that they invested 
considerably  less  in  relation  to  GDP.  In  Germany,  the 
financing balance therefore grew steadily to around 6 p.c. 
of GDP. In contrast, in 2006 French individuals invested 
more as a percentage of GDP than in 1995, reducing their 
financing balance to around 3.5 p.c. of GDP.
3.    The operating surplus, profit and 
financing balance of companies
Whereas gross disposable income is a key concept which 
is often used in the case of individuals, it is normally only 
the gross operating surplus that is considered in the case 
of  companies.  The  importance  of  that  concept  is  due 
mainly to the fact that other forms of corporate income 
are much less significant than they are for individuals. For 
example,  companies  do  not  receive  any  social  benefits 
and  their  net  interest  income  is  modest  compared  to 
that of individuals. Nonetheless, in order to take account 
of other forms of corporate income, this article uses a 
gross  profit  measure  based  on  the  national  accounts 
data. This measure is calculated as the sum of the gross 
operating  surplus,  net  property  income  –  but  exclud-
ing  dividends  –  and  the  balance  of  current  transfers, 
excluding  the  taxes  on  corporate  income  and  wealth. 
Examination of the purposes for which the profit accord-
ing to this concept is used reveals the extent to which 
the steep rise in the operating surplus of companies has 
also benefited the other domestic sectors, and particularly   
individuals.
3.1    The operating surplus and profit of companies
Between 1995 and 2002, the gross operating surplus of 
companies fluctuated around 20.5 p.c. of GDP. However, 
in  the  ensuing  three  years  it  increased  sharply ;  since 
2005 it has totalled roughly 23.5 p.c. of GDP. On aver-
age, the gross profit of companies was roughly 1 p.c. of 
GDP higher than their gross operating surplus, and fol-
lowed a fairly similar trend. The main difference lies in the 
  balance of current transfers, excluding taxes on income 
and wealth, which averaged 0.7 p.c. of GDP. During the   
1995-2007 period, the net property income of companies, the incoMes and financing Balance of individuals  
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even disregarding the net dividends paid to other sectors, 
averaged only 0.3 p.c. of GDP.
The gross operating surplus is therefore by far the most 
important  income  source  for  companies.  Since  2002 
it has risen strongly, especially in 2004 and 2005 with 
increases of 12.7 and 9.2 p.c. respectively. For a better 
understanding of the movement in the gross operating 
surplus of companies it is useful to consider a breakdown 
between the gross operating margin per unit of sales and 
the number of units sold  (1). This breakdown shows that 
companies have managed to achieve a substantial rise in 
their gross operating margin per unit of sales in every year 
since 2002, in contrast to the situation during the second 
half of the 1990s, and since 2004 they have also achieved 
a relatively strong increase in their volume of sales.
Nevertheless, the significant increase in the gross operat-
ing  surplus  followed  the  mediocre  results  recorded  by 
companies in 2001, when their gross operating surplus 
had dropped by 1.2 p.c. In that year, costs of domestic 
origin – principally labour costs – rose strongly in com-
parison with the increase in selling prices. The resulting 
downward pressure on the operating margin was partly 
offset by the slight improvement in the terms of trade, as 
the rise in prices of imported inputs lagged slightly behind 
the increase in selling prices on the export markets, thus 
bolstering corporate margins. Yet this could not prevent 
the gross operating margin per unit of sales from falling 
by 1.7 p.c. In addition, growth in the volume of sales was 
very feeble at 0.5 p.c., compared to an average of 4.2 p.c. 
in 1996-2000.
Following the sharp economic slowdown in 2001, which 
severely depressed both selling prices and demand, com-
panies tried to restore their gross operating margin per 
unit of sales by curbing the rise in labour costs. In 2002 
they  could  only  do  this  by  boosting  labour  productiv-
ity, since the increase in hourly labour costs was already 
stipulated in the central agreement concluded at the end 
of 2000. The expansion of the operating margin in that 
year was therefore due primarily to a substantial improve-
ment in the terms of trade, as import prices fell more 
steeply than selling prices on the export markets. During 
2003-2005 companies were able to increase their operat-
ing margin further as a result of the weaker rise in costs 
of domestic origin, including labour costs, and thanks to 
the relatively strong rise in selling prices on the domestic 
market. In 2004 and 2005, the impact of the increase 







































CHART 6  GROSS OPERATING SURPLUS AND GROSS PROFIT 
OF COMPANIES
  (percentages of GDP)


















































CHART 7  MAIN COMPONENTS OF THE GROSS OPERATING 
SURPLUS OF COMPANIES
  (contribution to the growth of the gross operating surplus, 
percentage points)
Sources : NAI, NBB.
(1) Including the change in stocks.
Volume of sales (1)
Gross operating margin per unit of sales
Gross operating surplus of companies
e
(1)  Including the change in stocks.88
the vigorous growth in the volume of sales on both the 
domestic and the export markets. The strong increase in 
the operating margin per unit of sales combined with a 
substantial rise in the volume of sales therefore explains 
the exceptionally steep increase in the operating surplus 
in those two years.
In 2006 and 2007, the increase in the operating margin 
per  unit  of  sales  was  less  pronounced.  For  one  thing, 
selling  prices  on  the  domestic  market  did  not  rise  as 
quickly as in the preceding years. Also, costs of domestic 
origin – and especially labour costs – accelerated again in 
response to the rising tensions on the labour market. At 
the same time, however, strengthening demand helped 
to limit the impact of the stronger rise in labour costs on 
the operating surplus of companies, since they were thus 
able to continue expanding their volume of sales fairly 
substantially.
3.2    How do companies use their profit ?
The past five years have seen a surge in corporate gross 
profit, with an average rise of 7.5 p.c. per annum, mainly 
as a result of the strong increase in their gross operat-
ing surplus. The question is whether this substantial rise 
has also benefited the other domestic sectors, and more 
particularly individuals. To answer that question, this arti-
cle examines the extent to which companies have also 
stepped up their expenditure or increased their financing 
balance. If the increase in the gross operating surplus has 
led to a rise in the amount of taxes paid on income and 
wealth or an increase in the net dividends paid to other 
sectors, there is clearly some redistribution of the income 
flows. If the larger gross operating surplus has led to more 
investment, that can also be viewed as a form of redis-
tribution between sectors. All other things being equal, 
higher investment boosts the economy’s growth poten-
tial, and that in turn leads to a stronger rise in the wage 
bill and hence the disposable income of individuals.
Whereas, on average over the past three years, compa-
nies’ gross profit exceeded the 2002 figure by 3.3 p.c. of 
GDP, their financing balance increased by 2.2 p.c. of GDP 
over the same period. At first sight, individuals therefore 
seem  to  have  gained  less  benefit  than  the  companies 
themselves from the strong profit growth. Nevertheless, 
the taxes which companies paid on income and wealth 
kept fairly closely in line with the movement in their gross 
profit. Thus, in the period from 2005 to 2007, those taxes 
exceeded the taxes paid in 2002 by 0.6 p.c. of GDP, rep-
resenting 18 p.c. of the increase in their gross profit. In 
addition, the gross investment of companies expressed as 
a percentage of GDP has also increased from 12.2 p.c. in 
2002 to an average of 13.5 p.c. in the past three years. 
In the last two years in particular, owing to the strong 
growth of the gross profit, the gradual increase in external 
financing costs has not weakened corporate propensity 
to invest. The fairly strong increase in the financing bal-
ance of companies is therefore due mainly to the gradual 
decline in the net dividends paid to other sectors, as a 
percentage of GDP. During 2005-2007, the net dividends 
which  companies  paid  to  other  sectors  were  down  by 
an average of 0.4 p.c. of GDP compared to 2002, even 
though their gross profit after tax was up by 2.7 p.c. of 
GDP. For completeness, it should be mentioned that in the 




















Gross proﬁt  ......................... 21.4 20.6 21.4 22.9 23.6 24.3 25.0 24.9
Taxes on income and wealth (–)  ....... 3.0 3.2 3.2 3.0 3.3 3.6 3.9 3.8
Net dividends paid to other sectors (–) .. 4.2 5.2 5.5 5.5 5.0 5.2 4.9 5.2
Gross investment (–)  ................. 13.1 13.6 12.2 12.2 12.9 13.0 13.7 13.9
Other uses  (1) (–)  ..................... 0.1 0.4 0.3 1.4 0.5 0.3 –0.2 –0.4
Financing balance  .................. 0.9 –1.7 0.3 0.9 1.9 2.2 2.7 2.4
Sources : NAI, NBB.
(1)  Net capital transfers paid to other sectors, net acquisitions of non-produced non-ﬁnancial assets such as land, patents and goodwill, and the change in the net claims of 
households on pension funds.
 the incoMes and financing Balance of individuals  
and coMpanies
89
past three years companies have received more net capital 
transfers than in 2002, and that has also contributed to 
the increase in their financing balance.
However,  the  weaker  growth  of  net  dividends  paid  by 
companies to other sectors over the past five years needs 
to be qualified, as there was a very strong rise in the net 
dividends which they paid in the period 2000-2002. On 
average, during 1995-1999 those dividends represented 
22.6 p.c. of gross profit after tax, but in 2001 and 2002 
that ratio increased to 30 p.c. If the 2002 peak is taken 
as the benchmark, then net dividends paid as a percen-
tage of GDP declined fairly sharply in the ensuing years. 
However, by reference to the period 1995-2000, the net 
dividends paid by companies to other sectors have actu-
ally risen faster than GDP.
The  years  2001-2002  also  constituted  an  exceptional 
period  for  gross  investment.  After  the  bursting  of  the 
stock  market  bubble  and  the  general  economic  slow-
down, gross investment grew very slowly because com-
panies gave priority to consolidating their balance sheets. 
The strong expansion of investment in subsequent years 
must  therefore  be  regarded  partly  as  making  up  lost 
ground.
In  the  past  three  years,  the  gross  profit  of  companies 
has been 3.3 p.c. of GDP higher than in the reference 
period 1995-2000. That rise has resulted in an increase 
in  their  redistributive  expenditure  in  the  broad  sense 
(including investment) amounting to 2 p.c. of GDP, and 
an increase of 1.5 p.c. of GDP in their financing balance. 
Whatever the reference period considered, the financing 
balance of companies has therefore still risen significantly. 
That improvement means that companies have gradually 
been  able  to  finance  more  of  their  investment  out  of 
internal resources, so that their degree of financial inde-
pendence – i.e. the ratio between equity capital and total 
liabilities – has steadily increased.
3.3    The financing balance of companies in an 
international perspective
In  Belgium’s  three  main  neighbouring  countries,  the 
financing balance of companies also showed a drop in 
2000-2001. However, the speed and strength with which 
that balance recovered in subsequent years varied greatly 
from one country to another.
Germany was the country where the financing balance of 
companies showed the sharpest fall (down to –6.3 p.c. of 
GDP in 2000), but it recovered very quickly. In 2002, the 
deficit had already been converted to a surplus of 1.1 p.c. 
of GDP. This was due partly to the increase in the gross 
operating surplus (particularly thanks to wage modera-
tion), but the main factor was the weak growth of invest-
ment. In the ensuing years, the gross operating surplus of 
companies continued to grow strongly, while the rate of 
expansion in gross investment lagged behind. However, 
this did not lead to any further upward tendency in the 
financing  balance,  which  fluctuated  between  0.3  and 
2.2 p.c. of GDP without displaying any clear trend. For 
one thing, the increase in the gross operating surplus was 
partly negated by the fact that companies also paid more 
taxes. Also, the increase was offset by a fall in net prop-
erty income and in net capital transfers received, both in 
relation to GDP.
Much  the  same  pattern  emerged  in  the  Netherlands. 
Although  the  financing  balance  of  companies  hardly 
declined at all in 2001, it still recorded a very strong rise 
totalling 6 p.c. of GDP in the period 2002-2004. In the 
Netherlands,  too,  that  increase  was  due  mainly  to  the 
sharp  fall  in  the  investment  ratio,  although  the  gross 
operating  surplus  did  grow  slightly  faster  than  GDP. 
However, in 2005 and 2006, although the gross operating 
surplus continued to grow strongly, the financing balance 
















































CHART 8  INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF THE 
FINANCING BALANCE OF COMPANIES
  (percentages of GDP)





In contrast, in France the financing balance of compa-
nies did not tend to recover in the period 2001-2006. 
Although  that  balance  was  1.3  p.c.  of  GDP  higher  in 
2003 than in 2001, it then subsided to well below the 
2001 level. This recent pattern reflects the phenomenon 
mentioned earlier, namely that the wage share in France 
has not contracted in the past few years, in contrast to the 
situation in most other euro area countries. The strong rise 
in real labour costs per employee (outstripping productiv-
ity  growth)  has  driven  up  costs  and  therefore  reduced 
the gross operating surplus of companies. Conversely, in 
Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands wage moderation 
made a positive contribution to the increase in the operat-
ing surplus and financing balance of companies.
Conclusion
This  article  analyses  the  income  flows  of  individuals 
and  companies  on  the  basis  of  the  national  accounts. 
Although much attention focuses on the movement in 
the wage share, the article is broader in scope than that, 
because  it  also  examines  the  redistribution  of  incomes 
between sectors and the purposes for which individuals 
and companies use their income. The main findings can 
be summarised as follows.
Analysis  of  the  primary  incomes  arising  from  domestic 
production  reveals  that  companies  generate  the  most 
value added. In 2006, they used 60.6 p.c. of that value 
added to cover labour costs, a share that has however 
declined in recent years, as during 1995-2002 the aver-
age figure was 64.3 p.c. Conversely, general government 
creates the least value added but pays out most of it in 
the form of labour costs, namely 88 p.c. in 2006, com-
pared to 86.1 p.c. in 1995. In the case of the value added 
of individuals – both self-employed workers and home 
owners – only 10.6 p.c. was paid out in the form of labour 
costs in 2006.
There are various definitions of the wage share and they 
produce very different results in terms of level, but they 
mostly still present a similar picture. Thus, all definitions 
indicate a fairly stable pattern in the second half of the 
1990s,  followed  by  a  slight  rise  and  subsequently  a 
somewhat sharper fall during 2003-2005. In the past two 
years, there has been no further significant change in the 
wage share. Its contraction in 2003-2005 was partly a 
reflection of the business cycle. In response to the slacken-
ing pace of activity in 2001 and 2002, companies tried to 
reduce their labour costs via corporate restructurings and 
wage moderation. In addition, the recent pattern can also 
be regarded as part of the downward trend in the wage 
share since the early 1980s, just as in most other euro 
area countries. In the literature, that downward trend is 
often linked to structural developments such as globalis- 
ation which has expanded the labour supply worldwide, 
technological progress which has made production more 
capital intensive, and the growing importance of the serv-
ices sector which features a smaller wage share.
However,  wages  are  not  the  only  income  category  of 
individuals to have declined as a percentage of GDP. Since 
1995,  the  rise  in  the  total  gross  disposable  income  of 
individuals has almost continuously lagged behind GDP 
growth. That is due mainly to the downward trend in net 
interest income as a percentage of GDP, which in turn 
reflects the falling interest rates. However, the downward 
trend in individuals’ disposable income as a percentage of 
GDP does not mean that those incomes have also declined 
in absolute terms. On average, the disposable income of 
individuals increased by 3 p.c. per annum between 1995 
and 2007. Even taking account of inflation as measured 
by  the  private  final  consumption  expenditure  deflator, 
disposable income increased in real terms by an average 
of 1.1 p.c. per annum. Yet this positive average conceals 
the fact that disposable income did fall in absolute terms 
in certain years, or for certain population groups.
Like the gross disposable income of individuals in relation 
to GDP, their final consumption expenditure also displayed 
a downward trend, as a percentage of GDP. However, this 
was far less pronounced, and that was therefore reflected 
in a downward trend in the savings ratio, from 20 p.c. of 
disposable income in 1995 to a low of 12.2 p.c. in 2005, 
after which a gradual recovery set in. That recovery is not, 
however, evident in the financing balance of individuals, 
as they do not only consume but also invest, primarily in 
the form of housing construction and renovation. Since 
2004,  individuals  have  recorded  a  strong  rise  in  their 
investment  expenditure,  underpinned  by  the  very  low 
mortgage interest rates and the surge in house prices, 
and that has been reflected in a further decline in their 
financing balance which has been below 1 p.c. of GDP in 
the past three years.
The principal counterpart of the recent contraction in the 
wage share is the sharp increase in the gross operating 
surplus of companies, that surplus also being by far their 
main source of income. However, that increase has not 
led to a corresponding rise in the financing balance of 
companies, because the latter have also paid more taxes 
on income and wealth, and their investment spending has 
expanded faster than GDP. In comparison with the period 
1995-2000, companies have also paid out more to other 
sectors in net dividends, as a percentage of GDP, though 
dividends were even higher in the period 2001-2003. In all, 
individuals have therefore also benefited from the strong the incoMes and financing Balance of individuals  
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corporate profit growth. Nevertheless, the financing bal-
ance of companies has also risen steadily to an average of 
2.4 p.c. of GDP in the past three years. Although this rise 
can be viewed partly as making up lost ground, follow-
ing the deterioration during the period 1998-2001, the 
recent improvement still looks significant. It has enabled 
companies to move gradually towards financing more of 
their  investment  out  of  internal  resources,  thus  further 
consolidating their balance sheets.
The trend shifts in income flows described in this article 
are not peculiar to Belgium since they also occurred in 
most  other  euro  area  countries.  To  some  extent,  they 
are due to structural developments such as globalisation, 
technological progress and population ageing. Although 
such  developments  are  inevitable,  policymakers  can  do 
much to provide support, in particular by creating a robust 
and stable macroeconomic framework backed by efficient 
labour and product markets. Finally, it should be pointed 
out that there is no guarantee that the recent develop-
ments will continue at the same pace in the future, as is 
already apparent from previous long-term movements.